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Abstract—Android applications (“apps”) make avid use of
third-party native libraries to increase performance and to
reuse already implemented functionality. Native code can be
directly executed from apps through the Java Native Interface or
the Android Native Development Kit. Android developers drop
precompiled native libraries into their projects, enabling their
use. Unfortunately, developers are often not aware that these
libraries (or their dependencies) must be updated. This results in
the continuous use of outdated native libraries with unpatched
security vulnerabilities years after patches are available.
To assess the severity of the use of outdated and vulnerable
libraries in the Android ecosystem, we study the prevalence
of native libraries in the top applications of the Google Play
market over time, correlating the time when native libraries
are updated with the availability of security patches. A core
difficulty we have to solve for this research is the identification
of libraries and versions. Developers often rename or modify
libraries but we require precise information about each binary.
Our binary similarity metric bin2sim uses diverse features
extracted from the libraries to identify and map the required
information. Leveraging this bin2sim , we create an approach
called LibRARIAN (LibRAry veRsion IdentificAtioN) that can
accurately identify native libraries and their versions as found
in Android apps with a a 92.53% true-positive rate, no false
positives, and a 7.46% false-negative rate
In our study using LibRARIAN , we find that many libraries
are outdated and that security patches are applied with long
delays, if at all. We discovered that native libraries in apps are
updated, on average, 3 times slower than the release rate of
new versions of those libraries. For vulnerabilities, we found 80
apps with 1,781 vulnerable versions with known CVEs between
Sept. 2013 and April 2019, with 61 of those apps still remaining
vulnerable until the end point of our study. We find that app
developers took, on average, 507.21±70.97 days to apply security
patches, while library developers release a security patch after
19.04± 14.35 days—a 27 times slower rate of update.
I. INTRODUCTION
Third-party libraries are an integral part of the devel-
opment of mobile apps. Android developers opt for third-
party libraries due to their convenience and re-usability, since
utilizing them saves time and effort and allows developers
to avoid re-implementing functionality. Furthermore, native
libraries have become more prevalent in recent Android ap-
plications (“apps”), especially social networking and gaming
apps. These two categories of apps—which ranked among the
top categories on Google Play—require special tasks such as
3D rendering, and encoding and decoding of audio and video.
These tasks tend to be hardware-intensive and are, thus, often
handled by native libraries to improve runtime performance.
Despite the convenience and benefits that mobile develop-
ers obtain from third-party libraries, they can expose end-users
to a wide range of security attacks. For example, in August
2019, Kaspersky found that an app called CamScanner, with
more than 100 million downloads on Google Play, shipped
with a third-party ad library containing a malicious module that
signs users up for paid subscriptions [6]. Some other malicious
ad libraries have affected about 440 million Android users of
Google Play [1].
Prior work [24], [26] has shown that the ubiquity of third-
party libraries in Android apps increases the attack surface
since host apps expose vulnerabilities propagated from these
libraries [4], [7]. Another series of previous work has studied
the outdatedness and updateability of third-party Java libraries
in Android apps [13], [10], with a focus on managed code of
such apps (e.g., Java or Dalvik code). However, these previous
studies do not consider native libraries used by Android apps.
We argue that security implications in native libraries are
even more critical for three main reasons: First, app developers
add native libraries but do not keep them updated. The reasons
for this are manifold including concerns over regressions
arising from such updates, prioritizing new functionality over
security, deadline pressures, and other forms of negligence
(such as a lack of tracking library dependencies and their
security patches) that results in outdated or vulnerable native
libraries remaining in new versions of apps. Second, native
libraries are susceptible to memory vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer
overflow attacks) that are very difficult to exploit with managed
code of Android apps, i.e., Dalvik code. Third, and contrary to
previous studies [15], [28], native libraries are currently used
pervasively in top mobile apps. To illustrate this point, Table I
shows the pervasiveness of native libraries in the top 600 free
apps collected from Google Play between Sept. 2013 and April
2019. We obtained the version histories of these apps from
AndroZoo [8] totalling 12,646 versions of those 600 top free
apps. On average, there are 21 versions per app with as few as
1 version per app and as many as 136 for com.twitter.android.
From these apps, we identified 89,525 native libraries in total
with an average of 8 libraries per app—with as few as 1 native
library per app and as many as 141.
To better understand the usage of third-party native libraries
in Android apps and its security implications, we conduct
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Num. of apps containing native libs 540/600
AVG. versions per app 21 versions
MAX. versions per app 136
MIN. versions per app 1
AVG. native libs per app (including all app versions) 8
MAX. native libs per app (including all app versions) 141
MIN. native libs per app (including all app versions) 1
TABLE I: Prevalence of native libraries in the top 600 apps
on Google Play
a longitudinal study to identify vulnerabilities in third-party
native libraries and assess the extent to which developers
update such libraries of their apps. In order to achieve this,
we make the following research contributions:
• We construct a novel approach, called LibRARIAN
(LibRAry veRsion IdentificAtioN), that takes an un-
known native binary and identifies (i) the library it imple-
ments and (ii) the library’s version. We have demonstrated
this approach to be scalable to nearly 90,000 versions
of apps, allowing us to identify vulnerable and updated
versions of such apps.
• We introduce a new similarity-scoring mechanism for
comparing native binaries called bin2sim , which utilizes
8 feature vectors that enable LibRARIAN to distinguish
between different libraries and their versions. These fea-
tures represent the code elements of a library that would
be expected to change based on a versioning scheme that
distinguishes between major, minor, and patch versions
of a native library.
• We build a repository of Android apps and their native
libraries that contains the 600 most popular free apps
from Google Play totalling 12,646 versions gathered
between the dates of Sept. 2013 and April 29, 20191. This
repository further contains 89,525 native libraries used by
these 12,646 versions.
• By leveraging LibRARIAN , bin2sim , and our repository,
we conduct a study of the accuracy of LibRARIAN ,
finding that on 3,907 binaries with 81 distinct versions,
LibRARIAN obtains a 92.53% true-positive rate, no false
positives, and a 7.46% false-negative rate.
• We compare LibRARIAN with a state-of-the-art native-
library version-identification approach called OSSPolice
[14]. We demonstrate on OSSPolice’s ground-truth dataset
an over 10% accuracy improvement without having to
rely on source code—OSSPolice requires source code to
identify versions, limiting its applicability for Android
apps.
• We utilize LibRARIAN to study the outdatedness of
native libraries. From 10,018 library instances—which
serve as accurate representations of library versions using
bin2sim—we find that third-party libraries remain un-
changed, on average, for 252.12 ± 29.40 days with an
app’s native library being outdated as long as 1,147 days,
while new releases of these libraries are made available
every 83.05±18.49 days. As a result, many top free apps
on Google Play remain vulnerable for very long periods
of time.
1The majority of our analyses are up-to-date and contiguous but, e.g, the top
600 apps continuously change. We used April 29, 2019 as a cutoff, as building
a manual ground-truth data set (collecting library binaries with known versions
from different sources) to validate our results takes a considerable amount of
time.
• Using LibRARIAN , we examine 80 apps with 1,781
vulnerable versions with known CVEs between Sept.
2013 and April 2019. 61 of these apps remain vulnerable
up until the end of our data collection—indicating that
many of these apps are likely to remain vulnerable to this
day. We further find that these apps have a long period
of outdatedness, on average, of 628± 73.4 days.
• By utilizing LibRARIAN , we analyzed 19 apps with 317
versions, focusing on vulnerable versions of FFmpeg,
GIFLIB, OpenSSL, WebP, SQLite, and OpenCV between
Sept. 2013 and April 2019. We find that app developers
took, on average, 507.21 ± 70.97 days to apply security
patches, while library developers release a security patch
after 19.04 ± 14.35 days—a 27 times slower rate of
update. These libraries that tend to go for long periods
without being patched affect highly popular apps with
billions of downloads and installs.
II. LibRARIAN
Figure 2 shows the overall workflow of LibRARIAN which
enables identification of native libraries and their versions.
While our approach is general, we analyze native libraries
used in Android apps. Given a set of native binaries with
unknown library names and versions extracted from Android
apps (Unknown Lib Versions in Figure 2) and a set of native bi-
naries with known libraries and versions (Known Lib Versions
in Figure 2), LibRARIAN identifies libraries and outputs a
final set of versions detected for third-party native libraries of
Android apps by matching the unknown versions with known
versions.
LibRARIAN begins by performing an initial Library Iden-
tification as depicted in Figure 2, which utilizes the naming
convention for shared libraries described in the Linux Doc-
umentation Project [5]. This convention states that naming
shared objects must start with the prefix “lib” followed by the
name of the library and the extension “.so” and ending with
a version number reflecting the incremental changes in the
library (e.g., libreadline.so.3.0 for version 3.0 of the readline
library). Library Identification parses the name of the file
by eliminating the “lib” prefix, “.so” extension, and version
numbers to obtain an initial library name (e.g., “readline”).
Although developers do not always utilize such a naming con-
vention, they often include some part of the correct name of the
library (e.g., readline, opencv, etc.), which our evaluation (see
Section V) corroborates, allowing LibRARIAN to potentially
perform far fewer comparisons.
One of the key challenges of identifying many versions
of Android-app native binaries is reducing the number of
duplicate native binaries (i.e., Binary Duplicate Elimination in
Figure 2). In particular, such a step makes manually verifying
the accuracy of LibRARIAN ’s version identification substan-
tially more feasible. As an example, from a total of 89,525
native binaries extracted from multiple versions of the top 600
apps on Google Play, LibRARIAN reduced this number to
10,018 unique binaries—a factor of 8.93x.
To eliminate duplicate native binaries, LibRARIAN first
clusters any native binaries that share the same sha256 code
into the same cluster. This Hash Code Clustering, as shown
in Figure 2 produces a set of unique library instances, i.e.,
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Library Instanceshc. LibRARIAN then performs a second
type of clustering, which we refer to as Bin2Sim Cluster-
ing, that creates clusters by analyzing binaries in signifi-
cantly more detail to further reduce duplicates. This cluster-
ing results in another intermediate set of library instances,
i.e., Library Instancesb2s in Figure 2. Bin2Sim Clustering
leverages our novel technique for computing the similarity
between native binaries called bin2sim . Note that Hash Code
Clustering is an optimization step which reduces the runtime
needed to perform Binary Duplicate Elimination. Bin2Sim
Clustering can eliminate all duplicates that Hash Code Clus-
tering eliminates.
In the final step, Version Identification determines the
versions of binaries in Library Instancesb2s by leveraging
bin2sim to match those instances with binaries in Known Lib
Versions.
III. bin2sim
To properly identify library versions, LibRARIAN relies
on bin2sim to perform Bin2Sim Clustering and Version
Identification as described in the previous section. bin2sim (i)
generates feature vectors from native binaries and (ii) computes
a similarity score between source and target feature vectors.
Prior to elaborating on these two major elements of bin2sim ,
we first discuss the manner in which native binaries work in
Android apps.
A. Feature Vector Extraction
All shared libraries included in Android apps are compiled
into Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) binaries. Like
any other object files, ELF binaries contain a symbol table
of externally visible identifiers such as function names, global
symbols, and local symbols. Many GNU binutils tools [3] (e.g.,
objdump, nm, and strings) and binary analysis frameworks
(e.g., angr [25]) refer to the symbol table to reverse engineer
an executable.
To distinguish between different libraries and their ver-
sions, we need to identify features, which allow LibRARIAN
to differentiate between instances of a particular library and
its various versions. To that end, we define a set of 8 fea-
tures that LibRARIAN uses to identify versions and libraries.
Table II shows the list of all features used by bin2sim . The
primary collected features include the following: exported and
imported functions, exported and imported globals, and library
dependencies. These features represent the code elements
of a library that would be expected to change based on a
versioning scheme that distinguishes major, minor, and patch
versions of a library. Furthermore, these features are available
across platforms regardless of the underlying architecture or
compilation environments.
In general, bin2sim’s matching algorithm takes these five
features into account when computing the similarity score
between app binaries and source binaries. For libraries where
the functions are called through a dispatcher function (e.g., the
RenderScript and Unity libraries export a single function that,
based on runtime parameters, dynamically invokes the desired
functionality), these features fail to provide any sufficient infor-
mation about the underlying components in a library. In such
cases, additional features are considered as a second factor.
These features include strings that reside in the .comment sec-
tion of the ELF symbol table, strings associated with specific
keywords like “version” or Java package names, and certain
debug strings and commands. The Allstrings feature is used for
debug purposes only, it is not considered when computing the
similarity score. Any symbols that are volatile across different
architectures and build environments like compiler internals,
relocatable entries, and debug symbols are not extracted.
B. Similarity Computation
bin2sim relies on the Jaccard coefficient to determine
the similarity between feature vectors. The Jaccard coefficient
allows bin2sim to account for addition or removal of features
among different versions of the same library. Given two
binaries b1 and b2 with respective feature vectors FV1 and
FV2, the Jaccard coefficient is the size of the intersection of
FV1 and FV2 (i.e., the number of common features) over the
size of the union of FV1 and FV2 (i.e., the number of unique
features):
JaccardSim(FV1, FV2) =
| FV1 ∩ FV2 |
| FV1 ∪ FV2 |  [0, 1] (1)
The similarity score is a floating-point value between 0 and
1, with a score of 1 indicating identical features, and a score
of 0 indicating no shared features between the two libraries.
We classify a library as partially matching if the score drops
below 1, this implies that only a subset of the features included
in the feature vectors match.
Bin2Sim Clustering (as shown in Figure 2) groups binaries
into the same cluster if their Jaccard coefficient matches
exactly (i.e., scores a 1). In such cases, the matches must be
exact since the goal is to remove duplicates for that step of
LibRARIAN . On the other hand, Version Identification counts
an unknown library instance from Library Instancesb2s as
matching a known library version if their Jaccard coefficient
is above 0.85. This threshold was determined experimentally
and works effectively as our evaluation will demonstrate (see
Section V).
A low similarity score might result from modifications
made by app developers to the original third-party library
which results in the removal or addition of specific features.
From our experience, removal of features from the original
library is common among mobile developers and is likely
driven by the need to reduce the size of the library and
the app as much as possible (e.g., we observed that the
webp video codec library is often deployed without encoding
functionalities to reduce binary size). Some size optimization
techniques require choosing needed modules from a library and
leaving the rest, stripping the resulting binary, and modifying
build flags. Another factor that reduces similarity as measured
by the Jaccard coefficient is that certain architectures tend to
export more features as compared to others. For instance, 32-
bit architectures such as armeabi-v7a and x86 export more
features compared to arm64-v8a and x86_64.
IV. APPLICATION AND LIBRARY REPOSITORY
To study the security implications of the usage of third-
party native libraries, we apply our approach to libraries
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Lib Versions
Known Lib 
Versions
Hash Code 
Clustering
Bin2Sim 
Clustering
Library 
Instanceshc
Library 
Instancesb2s
Version 
Identification
Identified 
Library 
Versions
Binary Duplicate Elimination
Library 
Identification
LibRAry veRsion IdentificAtioN (LibRARIAN)
Fig. 1: LibRARIAN identifies versions of native binaries from Android apps by using our bin2sim similarity-scoring technique
to compare known and unknown versions of native binaries.
Feature Name Feature Definition
Global Variables Variables defined in a library that are either linked to other libraries or imported by them
Imported Globals Variables accessible to a library and originating from other libraries
Exported Functions Functions defined in a library that are either linked to other libraries or imported by them
Imported Functions Functions accessible to a library and originating from other libraries
Dependencies The library dependencies that are automatically loaded by the ELF object
AllStrings A string dump of the .rodata section of an ELF object which contains read-only initialized data
Debug Strings Strings obtained from the .comment section of an ELF object which represents the version used to compile the binary and its execution
environments
String Identifiers A subset of AllStrings which includes any string that parses as an identifier (e.g., mangled C++ identifiers). This feature also contains
keywords such as “version’.’
TABLE II: List of features bin2sim extracts from native binaries of Android apps
Source Binary
Target Binary
Feature 
Extractor
Feature 
Extractor
Bin2Bin Score 
Calculator
Similarity Score
Source Features
Target Features
Fig. 2: bin2sim takes two binary files (e.g., one extracted
from an Android .apk file and another compiled from source
code) and obtains a similarity score using either the Jaccard
coefficient or the overlap coefficient.
extracted from the top apps in Google Play. To that end, we
track the version history of the top 600 apps from Google
Play, which we extract from AndroZoo [8], a large repository
of over 9 million Android apps collected from several markets,
including Google Play, over several years. Our repository
contains app metadata including the app name, release dates,
and native binaries.
Unfortunately, Android does not require developers to
follow any specific versioning scheme except that the version
code must increase monotonically between updates. Moreover,
Google Play only provides release dates of the most recent
apps. Since the release dates are an important factor in our
longitudinal study, we use the timestamp denoting the time at
which an APK was added to AndroZoo to estimate updates of
apps. This timestamp represents the latest possible date the app
may have been added to AndroZoo. For these release dates,
we determined that the developers of the apps in our dataset
release an app update on average every 57.27± 3.17 days.
Overall, we collected 12,646 apps, where each app is a
version of the 600 top apps from Google Play. This results
in an average of about 21 versions per app with a minimum
of 1 version per app and a maximum of 136 for the app
com.twitter.android. The average duration between an app’s
earliest release date in our dataset and its latest release date
is 833± 30.43 days—with a maximum of 2,146 days (≈ 5.8
years) for the app com.handmark.expressweather.
We determined that 540 out of 600 (90%) of the distinct
apps in our repository contain at least one native library,
i.e., 10,792 out of 12,646 (85.34%) of the total apps in our
database. There are a total of 89,525 libraries (.so files) in our
repository with an average of 8 libraries per package and a
maximum of 141 for one version of com.instagram.android.
In fact, com.instagram.android—for which we collected 130
versions since Dec. 2013—contains 5,704 .so files in total.
We then build a repository for the libraries extracted from
Android apps for which we will apply LibRARIAN to identify
libraries and detect versions. The first task is to reduce the
number of native libraries by removing any duplicate files.
Recall that we found ≈ 90k native libraries in the top 600
apps of Google Play. After applying Hash Code Clustering
from Figure 2 on extracted libraries, we reduce their number
from 89,525 to 18,300 Library Instanceshc. The next step to
reduce duplicate binaries (Bin2Sim Clustering in Figure 2)
decreases the number of Library Instanceshc to 10,018
Library Instancesb2s.
We run LibRARIAN on a machine with 2 AMD EPYC
7551 32-Core CPUs and 512GB of RAM running Ubuntu
18.04. The total execution time for Hash Code Clustering is
2.5 hours while the total time to further cluster the resulting
Library Instanceshc using Bin2Sim Clustering is 1.5 hours.
We optimized the latter approach by utilizing the length of
feature vectors, i.e., we avoid computing the bin2sim between
two feature vectors unless both of them have the same number
of features. This optimization reduced the required time to
produce Library Instancesb2s from 8 months to 1.5 hours.
The average number of features in the extracted feature
vectors (excluding Allstrings and Debug Strings) is 6,014.81±
260 features. Some outliers such IL2CPP (Unity’s scripting
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backend) library and UE4 (Unreal Engine 4) library include
389,345 features. This shows that the set of third-party native
libraries in our repository is diverse, some of them are very
complex and offer a large number of functionalities. For such
complex binaries, the average time to generate the feature
vector is 4 min and 38 sec.
V. EVALUATION
To conduct our study of native libraries in Android apps,
we answer the following four research questions:
RQ1: How accurate is LibRARIAN at identifying versions
of native libraries? How does LibRARIAN compare against
state-of-the-art native-library version identification?
RQ2: How outdated are native libraries of Android apps?
RQ3: How prevalent are vulnerabilities in native libraries of
Android apps?
RQ4: In case a vulnerability was reported for a third-party
library, how quickly did developers apply patches?
A. RQ1: Accuracy
1) Independent Accuracy: In order to evaluate the accuracy
of LibRARIAN , we select the subset of native libraries from
our library repository (as described in Section IV) that contain
the exact version number of a library in the string literals. In
total, there are 3,907 binaries (268 Library Instanceshc) in
our repository. After eliminating duplicates, we obtained 81
distinct versions of 18 libraries that serve as ground truth for
this analysis (Table III). We then apply LibRARIAN to these
binaries to assess its accuracy based on our bin2sim feature
comparison (Section III-B).
Library Name Library Versions
Crashlytics 0.5.0, 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.1.1-1.1.5, 2.0.0-2.0.5
OpenCV 2.4.1, 2.4.13, 3.1.0
OpenCV_core 2.4.11, 2.4.13
OpenCV_imgproc 2.4.11, 2.4.13
LibVPX 1.3.0-1.7.0
Firebase 5.1.0-5.6.0
AVCodec 54.92.100, 55.18.102, 55.39.101, 55.52.102, 56.1.100,
57.64.101
AVFilter 3.90.100, 4.2.100, 5.1.100, 6.65.100
AVFormat 55.19.104, 55.33.100, 56.4.101, 57.56.101
AVUtil 52.18.100, 52.48.101,52.66.100,54.20.100, 55.34.101
swresample 2.0.101, 0.17.104
swscale 1.1.100, 2.2.100, 2.5.101, 2.5.102,3.0.100, 4.0.100
Vorbis 1.3.2, 1.3.3
XML2 2.7.7
OpenAL 1.12.854, 1.15.1, 1.18.2
OpenSSL 1.0.0a-1.0.0r, 1.0.1c-1.0.1r, 1.0.2h
SQLite3 3.11.0, 3.13.0, 3.14.1, 3.20.1, 3.24.0-3.26.0, 3.6.22, 3.7.17,
3.8.1-3.8.10
Mono 4.6, 4.6.3, 5.6
TABLE III: The list of 18 libraries (82 different versions) used
to evaluate the accuracy results of LibRARIAN
LibRARIAN correctly identifies 95.06% of the unique
versions (77 out of 81). Out of these 77 versions, 51 (66.23%)
have unique feature vectors—resulting in perfect matches
of unknown versions to known versions. The remaining 26
versions share similar feature vectors with a maximum of
1-2 other versions. This usually occurs between consecutive
versions—usually minor or micro revisions (e.g., 3.1.0 and
3.1.1). These minor or micro revisions generally fix small bugs
and do not change, add, or remove exported symbols.
We inspected the binaries reported with false positives and
found that our approach failed to detect the correct versions
of 3 binaries due to the fact that each of their target binaries
is missing from our ground truth (as shown in Figure 2). In
such cases, the version reported is the version of an existing
binary in the ground truth that is closest to the target binary.
One false negative (1%) is reported in our results—where
the target version exists in our repository yet the reported score
is low (< 5%). When we inspected the binary, we found that
it was modified by the app developers resulting in a much
smaller feature vector. Recall from Section III-B that bin2sim
penalizes target and source binaries if they do not contain the
exact same features.
2) Comparative Analysis: OSSPolice compares binaries
against source code to identify versions of the binaries, requir-
ing source code of the target libraries to build its index. We
repeatedly contacted the authors of OSSPolice but were unable
to obtain their non-public data index or sufficient information
to reproduce their setup. We performed a comparative analysis
between LibRARIAN and OSSPolice based on OSSPolice’s
published numbers [14]. The ground-truth data set in the
OSSPolice evaluation contains a total of 475 binaries (out
of which 67 are unique) extracted from 104 applications
collected by F-Droid [2]. Table IV highlights the evaluation
of OSSPolice and LibRARIAN on the same data set.
Approach #
Versions
Uniq.
Bins
True +ve False +ve False -ve
LibRARIAN 172 67 62(92.53%) - 5(7.46%)
OSSPolice 172 67 55(82%) N/A N/A
TABLE IV: Comparing accuracy of LibRARIAN with OSSPo-
lice on the OSSPolice data set.
LibRARIAN correctly identified 62/67 (92.53%) unique
binaries, improving precision by over 10% compared to the
accuracy reported by OSSPolice (82%). One binary was not
detected due to the incompleteness of our source repository,
while the remaining 4 were not identified because the library
functions are dispatched from a single function, hence, our
extracted features fail to provide sufficient information about
the underlying components in the library.
OSSPolice’s reported false positives and negatives are due
to the fact that it relies on simple syntactical features such as
string literals and exported functions. Our feature vectors con-
tain additional features such as imported functions, exported
and imported global variables, and dependencies that uniquely
identify different versions of binaries.
Furthermore, OSSPolice fails to detect internal clones (i.e.,
third-party library source code that is reused in the source
code of another library) as it heavily relies on the hierarchy of
OSS folders. bin2sim’s strict similarity metric (i.e., the Jaccard
coefficient) is resilient against this over-fitting to specific
names.
B. RQ2: Outdatedness of Libraries in Top Apps
To study the outdatedness of native libraries in Android
apps, we need to infer the versions of libraries in our repository
(see Section IV) in order to analyze when library version lvx
in app a is updated to library version lvy , whether lvx is
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completely removed from a at a specific point in time, or if
lvx remains unchanged.
Experiment Setup. Recall from Section II that LibRAR-
IAN requires a set of library binaries with known versions
(Known Lib Versions in Figure 1) to compare with binaries ex-
tracted from Android apps (Unknown Lib Versions in Figure 1)
for Version Identification in Figure 1. However, manually
identifying library versions for all binaries in our repository
is practically infeasible because of the large size of our
repository, which contains 89,525 binaries in total. The manual
process of searching for and matching library versions for each
binary—including building the library version from source or
identifying pre-built binaries from existing repositories or the
Web—would be intractable.
Nevertheless, we are interested in studying the outdat-
edness for as much of our repository as possible (i.e.,
all 89,525 binaries). To that end, we apply this study on
Library Instancesb2s instead of exact library versions. Recall
from Section IV that bin2sim eliminates duplicate binaries re-
sulting in 10,018 Library Instancesb2s. Each library instance
in Library Instancesb2s is a cluster of binaries that share
the exact same feature vector as used in LibRARIAN from
Section V-A.
We extracted 89,525 binaries from 540 unique Android
apps with ≈ 10k app versions. Next, we apply Hash Code
Clustering to eliminate duplicate binaries resulting in 18, 300
Library Instanceshc. We then perform Bin2Sim Cluster-
ing which further reduces the number of binaries to 10,018
Library Instancesb2s. Each instance in Library Instanceb2s
is associated with the name and version of the app from which
we extracted the binary. Using that information and release
dates of apps, we calculated the average outdatedeness of our
entire library repository.
Using Library Instancesb2s instead of library versions
allows us to study the outdatedness of thousands of binaries
instead of only hundreds. However, to allow us to study out-
datedness at the scale of all our repository’s binaries requires
a trade-off in accuracy: It is possible that different library
versions end up having the same feature vector. As a result, the
feature vectors of two binaries can be equal if changes made
between consecutive versions (e.g., version 3.0.0 and 3.0.1) of
libraries focus on small code changes. As a result a library
instance in Library Instancesb2s may have patches or minor
versions grouped together in the same library instance—recall
that library instances are clusters of binaries.
To obtain an idea of the extent to which a
Library Instanceb2s may contain multiple library versions, we
compared Library Instancesb2s with Library Instanceshc.
Every Library Instancehc contains exactly one library
version since each Library Instancehc contains a cluster
of binaries with the same sha256 hash code. Consequently,
any Library Instanceb2s with multiple Library Instanceshc
contains multiple versions and is likely a false positive.
We found that out of the 10,018 Library Instancesb2s,
70% each contain a single Library Instancehc; 17% and
6% each contain 2 or 3 Library Instanceshc, respectively.
The remaining 7% of Library Instancesb2s each contain
more than 3 Library Instanceshc. We closely examined
these Library Instancesb2s that contain more than one
Library Instancehc and assumed that, any time one of
these Library Instancesb2s appears in a newer version of an
app, the native library is updated—which is a conservative
assumption. We found this result to affect no more than 14%
of our results. For future work, we will look into a more
fine-grained form of version identification for these binaries,
allowing us to pinpoint and identify bug fixes in the binaries.
Results. On average, app developers update native libraries
every 213.02 ± 3.29 days. A substantial number of libraries
found in our app repository have been outdated for an ex-
tremely long period of time (over 5 years). This finding is
alarming, especially if the reason behind this staleness is not
due to the infrequent releases of libraries but rather the slow
adoption of newly released lib versions by app developers.
This is particularly concerning if a released library version is
a security patch which consequently exposes end-users to a
much longer vulnerability window.
Table V illustrates the extent of outdated native libraries
found in our app repository. We obtained this list by sort-
ing Library Instancesb2s based on the number of years a
Library Instanceb2s remains unchanged, starting with the
most outdated Library Instanceb2s along with the name of
the app from which we extracted this library. Table V includes
the top 30 out of 10,018 Library Instancesb2s in terms of the
number of years a Library Instanceb2s remained outdated.
We compute the outdatedness of a Library Instanceb2s as the
difference between (i) the time a specific Library Instanceb2s
was first seen in an Android app and (ii) the last time it was
seen before it was replaced by another Library Instanceb2s
or completely removed. Other factors in Table V include
the number of library updates that were available during
that period of library outdatedness and how many of those
updates were security patches. We obtain library statistics
about releases from the official library providers’ websites. For
the rest of this section, we refer to library releases that add
new features or fix bugs as regular updates, while we refer to
library releases with security patches as security updates.
To demonstrate the prevalence of outdated libraries in our
repository, we highlight a few examples from Table V. We
start with Instagram—the app with the largest number of app
versions in our list. Instagram includes a Library Instanceb2s
of libvpx that was first seen in the oldest version of Instagram
which dates back to January 2014 and was last seen in a recent
version dating back to November 2018. As a result, libvpx
was unchanged for 4.84 years across 96 different versions of
Instagram. During that period, 5 regular updates of libvpx were
available—none of which were used by Instagram.
SQLite released 33 library updates—which had the most
number of library updates among the remaining libraries—
between March 2016 and December 2018. 3 of those updates
were security related. During that same window, the navigation
app Waze used only one instance of libSQLite across 26 of its
versions. The same applies to libGPG—which remained stale
in two applications Sniper 3D and Lords Mobile for almost 3
years despite the fact that 28 new releases were made available
during that period including 2 security updates.
The average outdatedness of OpenCV, which was found
in 4 popular apps (Lyft, Ubercab, Groupon and PayPal), is
≈ 3 years. The developers of OpenCV release, on average, 6
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App Name Lib Name Lib First Seen Lib Last Seen Years Outdated Regular Updates Security Updates No. of App Versions
My Talking Tom libsoundstouch 2013-12-27 2019-03-15 5.22 10 0 12
Instagram libvpx 2014-01-20 2018-11-21 4.84 5 0 96
Super-Bright LED Flashlight libspeex 2013-12-26 2017-10-11 3.79 2 0 11
PicsArt Photo Studio libexif 2013-10-04 2017-03-23 3.47 0 0 40
Marco Polo libgpuimage 2016-03-01 2019-04-25 3.15 5 0 81
Duo Mobile libiconv 2016-03-01 2019-04-25 3.15 1 0 26
Duo Mobile libzbar 2016-03-01 2019-04-25 3.15 0 0 26
Flow Free libogg 2016-02-29 2019-04-22 3.14 2 0 15
Flow Free libopenal 2016-02-29 2019-04-22 3.14 5 0 15
Flow Free libvorbis 2016-02-29 2019-04-22 3.14 1 1 15
IMVU: 3D Avatar! libgpuimage 2016-02-29 2019-04-09 3.12 5 0 12
Lyft libopencv 2016-03-17 2019-04-26 3.11 12 3 77
Lyft libcardio 2016-03-17 2019-04-26 3.11 9 0 73
Lords Mobile libunity 2016-03-25 2019-03-25 3.00 29 1 52
Groupon libopencv 2016-04-09 2019-04-10 3.00 12 3 4
Lords Mobile libgpg 2016-03-25 2019-03-25 3.00 28 2 53
Sniper 3D Gun Shooter libgpg 2016-05-05 2019-04-17 2.95 28 2 27
Groupon libopencv 2016-05-09 2019-03-12 2.84 12 3 27
Xbox libxml2 2013-12-23 2016-10-15 2.81 4 4 14
Smule libogg 2013-10-16 2016-07-31 2.79 1 0 12
Smule libvorbis 2013-10-16 2016-07-31 2.79 2 0 12
Paypal libopencv 2013-10-25 2016-07-31 2.76 7 1 2
Waze libsqlite 2016-03-22 2018-12-27 2.76 33 3 26
Amazon Kindle libunwind 2016-07-06 2019-03-29 2.73 6 0 9
Ubercab libopencv 2013-11-20 2016-07-31 2.70 7 1 16
Line Webtoon libcocos2d 2016-07-29 2019-03-27 2.66 12 0 17
Instagram libogg 2013-12-15 2016-07-31 2.63 1 0 33
InShot libjpeg-turbo 2016-08-03 2019-03-11 2.60 6 3 23
Facebook Messenger libwebp 2013-12-27 2016-07-31 2.59 6 0 16
Duo Mobile libgif 2016-03-01 2018-09-13 2.54 2 1 18
TABLE V: The list of apps found with outdated Library Instancesb2s. The Lib Name column represents one Library Instanceb2s
of a library followed by the dates for which this Library Instanceb2s was first found in the app (Lib First Seen) and the date
it was last seen (Lib Last Seen). The number of years a library remained outdated is depicted in the Years Outdated column,
followed by the number of library updates that were available during that period and whether these updates were security related
(Regular Updates and Security Updates). The final column represents the number of intermediate app versions that used the
same Library Instanceb2s.
new versions per year. This release rate indicates that these
4 popular apps that use OpenCV missed 18 opportunities to
update that library to newer versions during the span of 3 years.
3 of those 18 newer versions contained patches for CVEs.
App Name Genre No. Installs Avg. Outdateness
(Days)
Progressive Finance 5M+ 1147.00
Flow Free Puzzle 100M+ 1029.64
YouVersion Bible Books 100M+ 999.00
Netflix Entertainment 500M+ 921.33
HBO GO Entertainment 10M+ 873.00
Lyft Maps 10M+ 853.00
Chase Mobile Finance 10M+ 773.00
Yelp Travel & Local 10M+ 602.83
Firefox Communication 100M+ 535.00
Waze Maps 100M+ 529.20
TABLE VI: The top 10 apps with the most outdated native
libraries
Besides assessing outdatedness of a particular library in
an app, we also analyze the slow update of libraries of an
Android app across all of its libraries. Table VI lists the top
10 apps in our dataset with the most outdated native libraries,
measured based on the average number of days during which
libraries of an app remained outdated. These apps have at
least 5 million installs—with one app, Netflix, having over 500
million installs. The average outdatedness for these apps range
from 529.90 days for Waze to as many as 1,147 days (almost
3 years) in the case of Progressive. The second-most neglected
app is Flow Free, which has an average outdatedness of 1,029
days (2.8 years) across all of its libraries. Netflix which has
the largest number of installs (500M+) in Table VI included
libraries that remained outdated for 921 days (2.5 years).
Library
Name
Avg. Outdated-
ness Across All
Apps (days)
Num. Re-
leases per
Year
Rate of Library
Release (days)
No. of
Apps
Using
Lib
libunity 105.55 13 28 2412
libmono 116.99 22 17 1816
libadcolony 141.77 6 60 1437
libcrashlytics 221.31 6 60 1257
libgpg 159.74 6 60 886
libopencv 290.65 6 60 641
libcardio 215.52 5 73 634
libgif 282.70 4 91 703
libglog 128.67 4 91 513
libfolly 102.19 37 10 415
libwebp 194.03 5 73 292
libgpuimage 293.20 2 182 202
libsqlite3 267.17 11 33 194
libvpx 435.62 2 182 181
libsqlcipher 169.00 4 91 137
libogg 635.00 1 365 136
libcrypto 400.16 10 36 132
libavutil 302.00 26 14 114
libavcodec 344.00 26 14 108
libopenal 237.30 3 121 90
TABLE VII: The top 20 most neglected/outdated native li-
braries in our dataset (Taking frequency into account)
Table VII lists the top 20 libraries that tend to be the most
outdated across all apps in our repository. These libraries are
used by as few as 20 versions of apps in the case of libopenal,
the OpenAL audio API, and as many as 2,412 versions of
apps for libunity, the Unity 3D game engine. We obtained
the average number of times a library is released with a new
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version per year from their official websites. The number of
releases per year ranged from a single release in the case of
Ogg (libogg), a bitstream codec library, to as many as 37
releases per year in the case of Folly (libfolly), the Facebook
Open-source Library. The Unity 3D library (libunity) occurred
the most in our app repository, totalling 2,412 out of 12,646
app versions (19%). Unity 3D releases, on average, 13 updates
per year (i.e., they release an update every 28 days). In our
data set, libunity remained outdated for an average of 105
days, indicating that app developers are 3.75 times slower at
updating to new releases of libunity.
libadcolony, libcrashlytics, libgpg and libopencv release a
new update every 60 days (6 updates per year). However, our
results indicate that app developers are 3.39 times slower in
terms of including the newly released updates of these libraries.
Developers of libgpuimage, libvpx, and libopenal release
updates less frequently (every 5 months) compared to the rest
of the libraries in Table VII. Yet, apps containing instances
of these 3 libraries have an average library outdatedness of
10, 14, and 9 months for libgpuimage, libvpx, and libopenal,
respectively.
Libogg releases, on average, a single new version every
year—the slowest release rate of all the libraries among the
top 20 most outdated libraries in Table VII. However, even
with this slow release rate, instances of this library in apps
remain unchanged for 1.7 years.
The most neglected library is libcrypto, which remains
outdated for an average of 13 months (400.16 days). New
versions of libcrypto were released every 36 days. As a
result, app developers were 11.12 times slower at updating
to new releases of libcrypto. Given the security and privacy
implications of not updating this cryptography library, the
fact that this library was the most neglected is particularly
concerning.
To summarize the overall outdatedness results, Table VII
depicts third-party libraries that remain unchanged for an
average of 252.12±29.40 days. New releases of these libraries
are made available every 83.05± 18.49 days—indicating that
instances of native libraries in Android apps are often neglected
for long periods of time before getting updated. This degree of
outdatedness jeopardizes end-user security, especially if these
outdated libraries contain security flaws.
App Name Package Name Genre No. Installs
Kik kik.android Communication 100M+
Groupon com.groupon Shopping 50M+
Uber com.ubercab Navigation 100M+
Uber Driver com.ubercab.driver Business 50M+
Uber Eats com.ubercab.eats Food & Drink 50M+
Lyft me.lyft.android Navigation 10M+
American Airlines com.aa.android Travel 5M+
Grubhub com.grubhub.android Food & Drink 10M+
Eventbrite com.eventbrite.attendee Entertainment 10M+
PayPal com.paypal.android Finance 50M+
TABLE VIII: Metadata of the apps reported in Figure 3
OpenCV Case Study. In addition to studying the preva-
lence of outdated libraries in our app repository, we conduct a
case study of the outdatedness of one particular native library,
OpenCV, which is a library for real-time computer vision.
OpenCV is particularly interesting because it was used by
Fig. 3: A timeline demonstrating the slow update rate of
a native binary (OpenCV) in 10 selected apps from our
repository. Broken vertical lines represent releases of OpenCV
in two-month intervals.
10 popular apps but no app used more than 3 versions of
the library—making it possible to effectively visualize the
timeline of OpenCV releases and potential OpenCV updates
for those 10 apps. Figure 3 shows that timeline for those 10
popular apps and the time at which three possible versions
of OpenCV were used. Metadata for those 10 popular apps is
presented in Table VIII. Each of the 10 apps used a maximum
of 3 Library Instancesb2s of OpenCV, as depicted by three
different colored bars, one for each Library Instanceb2s, in
Figure 3. Each of these instances correspond to a single library
version—although, it is possible that all three instances may
actually be the same library version.
There were 30 available releases of OpenCV between 2014
and 2019. Figure 3 visualizes releases, in two-month intervals,
as broken orange vertical lines. This relatively high frequency
of releases for OpenCV give developers of the 10 apps ample
opportunity to keep their apps updated with a recent version of
OpenCV. Ubercab, for example, used one instance of OpenCV
between late 2013 and early 2016 before switching to a second
instance that remained in the app until it was finally changed
to a third and final instance in mid-2018. During that period
(2013-2019), OpenCV released 30 updates, while Ubercab
only utilized up to 3 versions (only 11% of total updates).
Even with the latest update to OpenCV in Ubercab, there were
still at least 3 newer releases that Ubercab could have updated
to but did not.
PayPal and GroupOn used 3 different instances during this
timeline. Similarly, PayPal used only 3 instances of OpenCV
between late 2013 and late 2018 before it was completely
removed. Groupon switched between 3 different instances of
OpenCV in 2016 before reverting back to the second instance
which remained outdated until early 2019 before switching
back to the first instance. As a result, GroupOn had at least 9
newer releases of OpenCV it could have updated to.
OpenCV was included in both Uber Driver and Uber Eats
in early/mid 2016 and it remained outdated for two years
before they updated to another instance of OpenCV which
remained unchanged until the time of app collection. Between
that same period (2018 and onward), 10 new releases of
OpenCV were made available.
The remaining apps—Lyft, American Airlines, GrubHub
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and Eventbrite—use only one instance of OpenCV. The former
two apps still used the same outdated instance of OpenCV
despite the fact that at least 10 newer releases of OpenCV
were available—3 of which were security patches.
C. RQ3: Prevalence of Vulnerable Libraries in Top Apps
To study the prevalence of vulnerabilities in native libraries,
we need to identify their exact versions. To that end, we lever-
age LibRARIAN to identify potential library versions from our
repository in Section IV and then apply an additional manual
verification step to determine exact version information. Once
the versions are identified, we investigate the extent to which
native libraries of Android apps are vulnerable and remain
vulnerable.
Experiment Setup. Due to the time-consuming nature of
manually verifying the exact versions of libraries, we selected
500 Library Instancesb2s (i.e., clusters of native binaries
obtained using Bin2Sim Clustering), which cover 21,236
binaries (24% of the total binaries). We focus on binaries with
libraries that (i) are found in a greater number of apps and (ii)
have known CVEs.
We first manually locate source code of libraries for the
selected 500 Library Instancesb2s. To that end, we use readily
available auxiliary data such as keywords found in feature
vectors, binary filenames, and dependencies. Once we identify
potential source code, we retrieve the pre-built binaries of all
versions and architectures, if possible.
There are a variety of distribution channels where app de-
velopers can obtain third-party binaries. For RQ3, we obtained
such binaries from official websites, GitHub, and Debian
repositories. The binaries with known libraries and versions
for RQ3 contain 52 distinct libraries with a total of 961
versions and an average of 12 versions per library. Table XIV
in Section IX shows more detail about these 52 libraries.
Results. We found that, out of 21,236 binaries for which
we inferred their versions, 3,614 were vulnerable libraries
(17%) affecting 80 distinct apps with a total of 1,781 app
versions. 285 app versions (41 distinct apps) released between
Feb 2019 and April 2019 include a library with reported CVEs.
Table IX shows the list of native libraries with reported
vulnerabilities along with the number of affected apps between
the period of Sept. 2013–April 2019. Furthermore, we also
report the number of apps versions released between Feb.
2019–April 2019 that include a vulnerable library.
OpenCV and GIFLIB affect the most apps. OpenCV has
the largest number of affected apps with a total of 696 versions
(42 distinct) where 100 recent app versions (14 distinct)
still have a vulnerable instance of OpenCV. Note that most
applications do not include OpenCV directly but indirectly
through the dependencies of card.io which enables card
payment processing but comes with the two outdated versions
(2.4.11 and 2.4.13) of both opencv_core and opencv_imgproc.
Following OpenCV in the number of affected apps is GIFLIB,
which has two vulnerable versions found in a total of 594 app
versions (23 distinct). GIFLIB continues to affect 105 apps up
to the point in time we stopped collecting apps (April 29th,
2019).
SQLite3 has the largest number of vulnerable versions (10
in total) included in 21 apps with a total of 351 app versions. 18
apps released this year contain a vulnerable version of SQLite3
in April 2019.
One vulnerable version of XML2 was found in 38 versions
of Microsoft XBox SmartGlass and the library was not updated
for 6 years—still remaining vulnerable up to the point where
we collected apps for our repository. This particular case is
notable due to the extremely long amount of time the library
had been vulnerable and remained vulnerable.
Our results show that 80 apps (1,781 versions in total)
have been affected by a minimum of 1 vulnerable library and
a maximum of 4 vulnerable libraries covering dates between
Sept 2013 and April 2019. 61 of those apps still include a
vulnerable binary at the time of our app collection.
Table X shows 10 popular apps that are using at least one
library with a reported CVE at the time of our app collection.
We select this specific set of apps to highlight that vulnerable
libraries exist in apps with various installs (10M+ or 500M+)
and across different app categories. Moreover, we include apps
that were found to have multiple vulnerable libraries at the
same time.
TikTok, a social-media video app with a total of more than
500M installs, uses version 5.1.1 of GIFLIB with associated
CVE-2015-7555 since April 2016. Similar to TikTok, PicsArt
uses an instance of GIFLIB (version 5.1.4) which is vulnerable
since Feb 9th, 2019 and continued to be used in the app up to
the time of our app collection.
Lyft and Uber, two major ridesharing apps, use OpenCV-
2.4.11 and OpenCV-2.4.13, respectively. Not only are these
versions outdated—OpenCV-2.4.11 was released in July 2015,
and OpenCV-2.4.13 was released in April 2016—they are
also known to be vulnerable since August 2017 yet remain
unchanged in both apps. Two other subsidiaries of Uber,
UberDriver and UberEats, also contain the same vulnerable
version of OpenCV.
Kik Messenger, which has a download base of over
100M, contains two vulnerable libraries of OpenSSL-1.0.1s
and FFmpeg-2.2 both with a published CVE in Sept. 2016 and
Dec. 2016, respectively. Kik continued to use both vulnerable
versions until the date of of our app collection.
Another application that contains two vulnerable libraries is
Amazon Alexa, a virtual assistant used in Amazon Echo smart
speakers. It includes OpenSSL-1.0.1s which was reported
vulnerable 3 years ago (a few months before the release of
Amazon Alexa) and SQLite-3.11.0 which is associated with
CVE-2018-20346 since Dec 2018.
We found 80 apps with up to 1,781 vulnerable versions be-
tween Sept. 2013 and April 2019. Moreover, 61 apps (totaling
1,464 versions) remain vulnerable even at the time at which
we collected apps for this study with an average outdatedness
of 628± 73.4 days. These results indicate that apps are likely
to remain vulnerable even significantly after the time at which
we stopped collecting apps.
D. RQ4: Developers Awareness of Vulnerable Libraries
In this section, we investigate developers awareness of
vulnerable libraries and the speed at which they apply security
9
LibName # Vul. LibVers Vul. LibVers # Vers/App (#Apps) # Vers/App in 2019 (#Apps)
OpenCV 6 2.4.2, 2.4.11, 2.4.13, 3.1.0, 3.2.0, 3.4.1 696 (42) 100 (14)
WebP 3 0.3.1, 0.4.2, 0.4.3 293 (18) 3 (1)
GIFLIB 2 5.1.1., 5.1.4 594 (23) 105 (13)
AVCodec 6 54.92.100, 55.18.102, 55.39.101, 55.52.102, 56.1.100, 57.64.101 147 (5) 18 (2)
AVFiler 1 6.65.100 31 (1) 9 (1)
AVFormat 4 55.19.104, 55.33.100, 56.4.101, 57.56.101 137 (4) 18(2)
AVUtil 4 52.18.100, 52.48.101, 52.66.100, 54.20.100 122 (4) 9 (1)
swscale 4 2.2.100, 2.5.101, 2.5.102, 3.0.100 124 (4) 9 (1)
SQLite3 10 3.6.22, 3.7.17, 3.8.1, 3.8.2, 3.8.7.4, 3.8.10.2, 3.9.2, 3.11.0, 3.13.0, 3.14.1 351 (21) 66 (18)
XML2 1 2.7.7 38 (1) 4 (1)
OpenSSl-
crypto
8 1.0.0a, 1.0.0r, 1.0.1e, 1.0.1c, 1.0.1r, 1.0.1s, 1.0.2f, 1.0.2h 218(8) 25 (3)
TABLE IX: A list of libraries with reported CVEs found in our repository along with the number of apps that were affected
by a vulnerable library and the number of those apps released in 2019 containing a vulnerable version. #Apps is the number of
affected apps; #Vers/App is the number of versions per app.
AppName Genre Num. Installs Vulnerable Libs
TikTok Social 500M+ GIFLIB-5.1.1
PicsArt Photography 500M+ GIFLIB-5.1.4
Uber Navigation 100M+ OpenCV-2.4.13
Kik Communication 100M + FFmpeg-2.2,
OpenSSL-1.0.1s
eBay Shopping 100M+ OpenCV-2.4.13
My Talking Angela Games 100M+ SQLite-3.13.0
Amazon Alexa Music 10M+ OpenSSL-1.0.1s,
SQLite-3.11.0
GIPHY Editors 10M FFmpeg-3.2
Wells Fargo Finance 10M+ OpenCV-3.1.0
Lyft Navigation 10M+ OpenCV-2.4.11
TABLE X: 10 popular apps from Google Play which include a
vulnerable library that remained unchanged until our collection
of apps in April 2019.
patches. To determine the rate at which developers update
vulnerable libraries, we identify the duration between (1) the
release time of a security update and (2) the time at which app
developers applied a fix either by (i) updating to a new library
version or (ii) completely removing a vulnerable library. Recall
from Section IV that we collected the previous versions of the
top 600 apps from Google Play. Moreover, we inferred the
library versions from 21,236 apps using LibRARIAN . Given
the histories of apps and inferred library versions we can track
the library life span per app—i.e., the time at which a library
is added to an app and when it is either removed or updated
to a new version in the app.
To this end, we analyzed 19 apps (317 versions in total)
with vulnerable versions of FFmpeg, GIFLIB, OpenSSL, WebP,
SQLite, and OpenCV between Sept 2013 and April 2019. We
exclude apps that removed a library before a CVE was asso-
ciated with it and apps containing libraries that are vulnerable
up to the time of collection. We obtained the date at which
a library vulnerability was found; when a security patch was
made available for the library; and the time at which a change
was made to the vulnerable library, i.e., either updating to a
new version or removing the library.
We found that on average, library developers release a
security patch after 19.04 ± 14.35 days from a reported
CVE. App developers apply these patches, on average, after
507.21 ± 70.97 days from the date an update was made
available—which is about 27 times slower than the rate at
which library developers release security patches. This is a
concerning difference that exposes end-users to long vulner-
ability periods, especially considering that library developers
released fixed versions much sooner.
Table XI illustrates the slow rate at which app developers
applied security patches for vulnerable versions of the follow-
ing libraries FFmpeg, GIFLIB, OpenSSL, WebP, SQLite, and
OpenCV. In order to determine what type of fix was applied
by a developer, we checked the next app version where a
vulnerable library was last seen. We found that developers
either kept the library but updated to a new version, removed
a vulnerable version, or removed all native libraries in an app.
A denial-of-service vulnerability was found in versions
1.2, 2.1, and 2.4 of FFmpeg in June 2013, March 2014, and
November 2014, respectively. The average number of days a
security patch was released for these three vulnerable library
versions is 26.67. However, developers took nearly 3 years to
address vulnerabilities in Text Me, 2.6 years for Calm, and 2.2
years for InShot. Text Me and Calm opted for library removal,
while InShot updated to FFmpeg-2.8.
Facebook and Facebook Messenger, both contained
OpenSSL-1.0.1e which was announced as vulnerable in Dec.
2013. OpenSSL developers provided a security patch 14 days
after; however, developers of Facebook and Facebook Mes-
senger took 937 days and 801 days, respectively, to remove
the vulnerable library. Waze, another app that used a vulnerable
version of OpenSSL, removed that vulnerable version on March
2017, 162 days after a security update was released.
A heap-based buffer overflow was reported in GIFLIB-
5.1.1 at the end of 2015. The results show that 7 apps using
this vulnerable version of GIFLIB have an average time-to-
fix, i.e., total number of days elapsed before a fix was applied,
of 610 days, which is 35.88 times slower. This lag time is
particularly concerning since GIFLIB released a fix only 17
days after the vulnerable version.
Twitter, GoodRx, Amazon and BIGO include versions 0.4.2
and 0.4.3 of WebP which was fixed for an integer overflow
vulnerability in Oct. 2016. However, the apps containing
vulnerable WebP versions applied a fix at a much slower
pace—with Twitter taking 619 days, GoodRx taking 549 days,
and Amazon and BIGO both taking 359 days. BIGO eliminated
all native libraries in their app, while the remaining apps only
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AppName Vul. LibVersion Disclosed Patched Window (days) Fixed On Time-to-Fix (days) Means of Fix
Text Me FFmpeg-1.2 2013-06-09 2013-07-10 31 2016-08-01 1118 Vul. Lib removal
Sweatcoin GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2018-12-12 1070 Vul. Lib removal
Calm FFmpeg-2.1 2014-03-01 2014-03-24 23 2016-10-22 943 Vul. Lib removal
Facebook OpenSSL-1.0.1e 2013-12-23 2014-01-06 14 2016-07-31 937 Vul. Lib removal
Twitter GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2018-06-21 896 Vul. Lib removal
InShot FFmpeg-2.4 2014-11-05 2014-12-01 26 2017-01-30 791 Updated to ffmpeg 2.8
Facebook Messenger OpenSSL-1.0.1e 2013-12-23 2014-01-06 14 2016-03-17 801 Vul. Lib removal
GoodRx GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2018-04-12 826 Native Part Eliminatied
Amazon Shopping GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2017-10-04 636 Vul. Lib removal
Twitter WebP-0.4.3 2016-10-10 2016-10-10 0 2018-06-21 619 Vul. Lib removal
GoodRx WebP-0.4.2 2016-10-10 2016-10-10 0 2018-04-12 549 Native Part Eliminatied
PayPal OpenCV-2.4.11 2017-08-06 2017-09-16 41 2018-11-21 431 Vul. Lib removal
Instagram OpenCV-3.1.0 2017-08-06 2017-09-16 41 2018-11-21 431 Vul. Lib removal
Amazon Shopping WebP-0.4.3 2016-10-10 2016-10-10 0 2017-10-04 359 Vul. Lib removal
BIGO LIVE WebP-0.4.2 2016-10-10 2016-10-10 0 2017-10-04 359 Vul. Lib removal
BIGO LIVE GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2016-12-24 352 Vul. Lib removal
Badoo GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2016-10-17 284 Vul. Lib removal
Taco Bell OpenCV-2.4.11 2017-08-06 2017-09-16 41 2018-03-21 186 Vul. Lib removal
Waze OpenSSL-1.0.2h 2016-09-01 2016-09-22 21 2017-03-03 162 Vul. Lib removal
Airbnb GIFLIB-5.1.1 2015-12-21 2016-01-07 17 2016-07-31 206 Vul. Lib removal
United Airlines SQLite-3.8.10.2 2018-11-03 2018-11-05 2 2019-01-24 80 Vul. Lib removal
Waze SQLite-3.8.10.2 2018-11-03 2018-11-05 2 2019-01-09 65 Updated to 3.26.0
SUBWAY OpenCV-2.4.1 2017-08-06 2017-09-16 41 2017-11-10 55 Vul. Lib removal
Wish OpenCV-2.4.13 2017-08-06 2017-09-16 41 2017-10-03 17 Vul. Lib removal
TABLE XI: Combinations of apps and particular vulnerable library versions they have contained, the date the vulnerability
was publicly disclosed (Disclosed), the date in which a patch was made available (Patched), the period between vulnerability
disclosure and patch availability in days (Window), the date at which the patch was applied by the application developers (Fixed
On), and the total number of days elapsed before a fix was made (Time-to-Fix)
removed the vulnerable library.
A fix to an out-of-bounds read error that was affecting
OpenCV through version 3.3 was released 41 days after the
CVE was published. The vulnerable versions of this library
affect 5 apps in total. The library was removed from Twitter
and Instagram after 431 days, and from Taco Bell after 186.
SUBWAY and Wish were the fastest in terms of applying a
security patch with an average time-to-fix of 36 days.
Finally, SQLite3 released version 3.26.0, which fixes an
integer overflow found in all versions prior to 3.25.3. Waze
updated to the fixed version nearly two months after release of
the associated security update, while United Airlines removed
the library completely 80 days later.
The previous results show that app developers update
to new library versions very slowly—even if the existing
version contains severe security or privacy vulnerabilities—
which further places millions of users at risk, especially when
a vulnerability remains unfixed for longer periods of time.
To further understand the consequences of outdated vul-
nerable libraries, we calculated the average time-to-fix across
all vulnerable libraries per app. Table XII lists the top 15 apps
with the most number of days a vulnerable library remained
in an app until a fix for the vulnerability was applied. Text
Me had the longest lag between the vulnerable library being
introduced and fixed, i.e., 3 years. SUBWAY was the fastest at
almost 2 months. Individual apps had as few as over 5 million
installs and as many as over a billion installs.
Social-media apps took years, on average, to fix vulnerable
libraries. Facebook, Facebook Messenger and Instagram—
which have the largest install base with a total of 1 Billion
AppName Genre Installs AVG. Time-to-Fix (Days)
Text Me Social 10M+ 1148
Calm Health & Fitness 10M+ 965
Facebook Social 1000M+ 937
InShot Photography 100M+ 816
Facebook Messenger Communication 1000M+ 801
Twitter Social 500M+ 690.5
GoodRx Medical 5M+ 620.5
PayPal Finance 50M+ 431
Amazon Shopping Shopping 100M+ 430.5
Instagram Social 1000M+ 333
Taco Bell Food & Drink 5M+ 186
Airbnb Travel & Local 50M+ 136
Waze Navigation 100M+ 113.5
United Airlines Travel & Local 10M+ 80
SUBWAY Food & Drink 5M+ 55
TABLE XII: Top 15 most negligent apps in terms of the
average time to fix a vulnerable library
downloads—fix their vulnerable libraries on average after 690
days. Following Facebook, Inc. apps in terms of the largest
number of installs is Twitter with a total of 500M+ installs.
Similar to Facebook, Twitter has a slow fix rate of 690 days.
With billions of installs, these very long times to fix vulnerable
libraries in highly popular social-media apps places users at
significant security and privacy risks.
The remaining apps, have an average time-to-fix of
383.35 ± 116.4 days and range in the number of installs
between 5M+ and 100M+. With library developers releasing
security patches at an average rate of 19.04± 14.35 days, app
developers are still updating about 20 times slower, leaving
their users at substantial risk of being victims to exploits of
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the libraries their apps use.
LibName Genre AVG. Time-to-Fix (Days)
FFmpeg Multimedia framework 976
GIFLIB Graphics 540
OpenCV Computer Vision 204
OpenSSL Network 633
WebP Codec 408
TABLE XIII: Top 5 most neglected vulnerable libraries in
terms of the average time-to-fix
Table XIII lists the top 5 most neglected vulnerable libraries
across all apps. FFmpeg is the most neglected app with an
average time-to-fix of 2.7 years; WebP is the least neglected
library with an average time-to-fix of 1.1 years. Among these
5 libraries, the fact that it takes app developers 633 days, on
average, to update or remove vulnerable versions of OpenSSL
is particularly concerning due to its security-critical nature.
Regardless, all these apps give attackers ample amounts of
time to produce exploits for these known vulnerabilities.
VI. DISCUSSION:
Outdated and Vulnerable Native Libraries. For three
research questions in Section V, we investigated the degree of
outdatedness of third-party native libraries in Android apps, the
prevalence of vulnerabilities in native libraries, and the extent
to which app developers are aware of such vulnerabilities.
Our results from RQ2 (Section V-B) indicate that the top
20 most neglected libraries in our repository (as described in
Section IV) have an average outdatedness of 252.12 ± 29.40
days, despite the fact that new releases of these libraries
are made available every 83.05 ± 18.49 days. This indicates
that instances of native libraries in Android apps are often
neglected for long periods of time before getting updated.
This degree of outdatedness jeopardizes end-user security,
especially if these outdated libraries contain security flaws. At
the same time, this slow rate of library updates in Android apps
indicate that tracking library dependencies, their associated
security updates, and ensuring these new libraries can be
included in apps without introducing new regressions is a
challenge. One possible avenue of future work addressing this
challenge includes constructing means of automating native
library updates for Android apps—especially in ways that may
reduce possible regressions in them.
Findings in RQ3 (Section V-C) demonstrate that out of
21,236 binaries for which we inferred their versions, 3,614
were vulnerable libraries (17%) affecting 80 distinct apps with
a total of 1,781 app versions between Sept 2013 and April
2019. We found 80 apps with up to 1,781 vulnerable versions
between Sept. 2013 and April 2019. This constitutes about
13% of the top 600 apps on Google Play. More alarmingly,
61 apps with a total of 1,464 versions remain vulnerable even
at the time at which we collected apps for this study with an
average outdatedness of 628±73.4 days. These results indicate
that apps are likely to remain vulnerable even significantly
after the time at which we stopped collecting them. One
interesting piece of follow-up work based on this result is
surveying Android app developers to determine the reason for
this extremely slow rate of fixing vulnerable native libraries
in their apps. Such a study can further assess what forms
of support app developers would need to truly reduce this
slow rate of updating vulnerable library versions to ones with
security patches.
For RQ4 (Section V-D), we analyzed the speed at which
developers updated their apps to patched libraries and found
that, on average, library developers release a security patch
after 19.04 ± 14.35 days from a reported CVE. While app
developers apply these patches on average after 507.21±70.97
days from the date an update was made available (27 times
slower). Recall that we only consider apps in these cases that
actually ended up fixing vulnerable native libraries. The results
are even more severe for apps that do not fix those libraries
(e.g., 628 ± 73.4 days from RQ3). The results for RQ3 and
RQ4 corroborate the need to make app developers aware of
the severe risks they are exposing their users to by utilizing
vulnerable native libraries. Even for developers that actually
fix vulnerable native libraries the fastest, 1.2 years (i.e., 436.24
days) gives attackers plenty of time to create an exploit against
their apps.
An interesting finding of our research is that certain apps
that are likely to be less security- or privacy-sensitive (e.g.,
food and drink apps such as Taco Bell and Subway) have much
faster average time-to-fix rates than apps that are known to
have inherent security or privacy concerns (e.g., social-media
apps). Taco Bell’s average time to fix was 3.1 months; Subway
was almost 2 months. However, Facebook, Inc., Instagram,
and Twitter had a slow fix rate of about 1.89 years. A follow-
up study looking into the potential reasons for this stark and
surprising difference would be interesting future work.
Overall, our results demonstrate the degree to which native
libraries are neglected in terms of keeping them outdated or
leaving them vulnerable. Unfortunately, our findings indicate
that the degree of negligence of native libraries is severe, while
popular apps on Google Play use native libraries extensively
with 540 out of 600 top free apps (90%). Interesting future
work for our study includes uncovering the root causes of such
negligence and means of aiding developers to more quickly
update their native libraries (e.g., providing mechanisms to
automatically update native libraries while also testing for
regressions and possibly automatically repairing them).
Limitations of LibRARIAN . The results from RQ1 shows
that LibRARIAN detects versions of native libraries with high
accuracy (92.53%). The need to compare against binaries with
a known number of versions and libraries (i.e., Known Lib
Versions in Figure 2) limits LibRARIAN . Specifically, false
negatives reported in RQ1 occur when an unknown binary for
which we are trying to identify a library and version does
not exist in Known Lib Versions. In these cases, LibRARIAN
identifies the unknown binary as being the library and version
closest to it according to bin2sim that exists in Known Lib
Versions. One possibly way of enhancing LibRARIAN in such
cases is to leverage supervised machine learning, which may,
at least, be able to identify if the library is most likely an
unknown major, minor, or patch version of a known library.
Recall from Section II that our feature vectors are built
from syntactic symbols such as exported and imported func-
tions, and global variables. Although LibRARIAN reported
fewer false positives than OSSPolice (as shown in Sec-
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tion V-A2), we determined that our feature vectors sometimes
do not distinguish between 2-3 consecutive minor or patch ver-
sions. Potential enhancements that may improve LibRARIAN
and allow it to better distinguish between such consecutive
minor or patch versions including the following: (1) using
Library Instanceshc to aid in determining more fine-grained
differences among similar binaries, (2) identifying a higher
threshold of similarity specifically for minor or patch versions
(e.g., a threshold above 85% that is currently used for Version
Identification in Figure 2), or (3) utilizing supervised learning
as previously mentioned.
LibRARIAN focuses on benign native libraries that are
used as they are—i.e. they are not tampered with by an
adversary nor are they modified by app developers or fused
with other libraries. A library is fused if a single binary actually
contains significant functionality from multiple libraries. Our
approach as designed does not identify tampered or fused
libraries due to the fact that bin2sim’s use of the Jaccard
coefficient penalizes the score for binaries being compared if
they do not contain the exact same features. However, from our
own experimentation, we have found that replacing the Jaccard
coefficient with the overlap coefficient, which checks if one
binary b1 has a subset of features of another binary b2 can
identify fused or tampered libraries. The main open problem
in this regard is determining when to switch from using the
Jaccard coefficient to the overlap coefficient. Regardless, we
found very few instances of fused or tampered libraries in our
data set. Furthermore, we found that the Jaccard coefficient is
resilient against internal clones (i.e., third-party library source
code that is reused in the source code of another library), which
OSSPolice fails to detect.
VII. RELATED WORK
A series of work has demonstrated the importance of third-
party libraries for managed code of Android apps (i.e., Dalvik
code) and their security effects and implications [12], [9].
Derr et al. [12] investigated the outdatedness of libraries in
Android apps by conducting a survey with more than 200 app
developers. They reported that a substantial number of apps use
outdated libraries and that almost 98% of 17K actively used
library versions have known security vulnerabilities. Backes et
al. [9] report, for managed code-level libraries, that app devel-
opers are slow to update to new library versions—discovering
that two long-known security vulnerabilities remained present
in top apps during the time of their study. None of these studies
examined native third-party libraries in Android apps.
A wide variety of approaches have emerged that identify
third-party libraries with a focus on managed code. These
approaches employ different mechanisms to detect third-party
libraries within code including white-listing package names
[18], [11]; supervised machine learning [23], [21]; and code
clustering [27], [22], [20]. LibScout [9] proposed a different
technique to detect libraries using normalized classes as a
feature that provides obfuscation resiliency.
Some techniques identify vulnerabilities in native li-
braries by computing a similarity score between binaries with
known vulnerabilities and target binaries of interest [17][16].
VulSeeker [17] matches binaries with known vulnerabilities
using control-flow graphs and machine learning. discovRE
[16] operates at the function level and focuses on identifying
vulnerabilities even across CPU architectures.
Binary Analysis Tool (BAT) [19] and OSSPolice [14]
measure similarity between strings extracted from binaries and
features found directly in source repositories. Unlike LibRAR-
IAN , these approaches compare source code with binaries,
which introduces the issue of internal clones. Neither BAT
[19] nor OSSPolice [14] can detect internal code clones, while
LibRARIAN can, giving it superior ability to identify versions
of native libraries. Furthermore, BAT and OSSPolice rely on
simple syntactical features (e.g., string literals and exported
functions). Our feature vectors extract additional features—
such as imported functions, exported and imported global
variables, and dependencies that uniquely identify different
versions of binaries. As shown in Section V-A2, these addi-
tional features were a major factor in the superior accuracy of
LibRARIAN compared to OSSPolice.
None of this aforementioned related work has examined
the outdatedness of native libraries in Android apps and the
prevalence and the time-to-fix for vulnerable versions of such
libraries. As a result, our work covers a critical attack vector
that has been ignored in existing research.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Third-party libraries have become ubiquitous among popu-
lar apps in the official Android market, Google Play, with 540
out of the 600 top free apps on Google Play (90%) containing
native libraries. These libraries are particularly beneficial for
handling CPU-intensive tasks and for reusing existing code in
general. Unfortunately, the pervasiveness of native third-party
libraries in Android apps expose end-users to a large number
of attacks if security vulnerabilities remain unfixed.
To determine the extent to which these native libraries
remain outdated or vulnerable in Android apps, we study the
prevalence of native libraries in the top 600 apps on Google
Play across 12,646 versions of those apps. From these versions,
we extracted 89,525 native libraries. To identify versions of
apps, we constructed on approach called LibRARIAN that
leverages a novel similarity metric, bin2sim , that is capable
of identifying versions of native apps with a high accuracy—
a 92.53% true-positive rate, no false positives, and a 7.46%
false-negative rate.
Using LibRARIAN , we determine that native libraries in
apps are updated, on average, 3 times slower than the release
rate of new versions of those libraries. For vulnerabilities, we
found 80 apps with 1,781 vulnerable versions with known
CVEs between Sept. 2013 and April 2019, with 61 of those
apps still remaining vulnerable until the end point of our study.
We find that app developers took, on average, 507.21± 70.97
days to apply security patches, while library developers release
a security patch after 19.04± 14.35 days—a 27 times slower
rate of update.
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IX. APPENDIX
Table XIV lists the 52 libraries used as ground truth by
LibRARIAN for the identification and detection of unknown
libraries (Section IV).
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Library Name # Library Versions
AdColony 24
AVCodec 18
AVFilter 25
AVFormat 36
AVUtil 27
Breakpad 13
Card.io 30
Cocos2d 25
Crashlytics 16
Cronet 12
EXIF Library 24
Facebook folly 25
Facebook fresco 49
Firebase 32
GIFLIB 20
GLib 25
JavaScriptCore 14
Libglog 14
Libgpg 23
LibIconv 10
Libjpeg 7
Libncurses 10
Libopus 10
libpng 11
Libsepol 10
Libtnet 11
Libunrar 9
Libunwind 9
libvpx 24
LibZ2 6
MapBox GL 6
Mono 24
mpg123 12
MuPDF 10
OGG 6
OpenAL 16
OpenCV 112
OpenSSL 14
RenderScript 6
SDL 16
SDL_image 15
SDL_mixer 13
SDL_net 12
SDL_Pango 14
SDL_ttf 10
SQLite 14
swresample 11
swscale 13
Vorbis 15
WebP 41
XML2 12
TABLE XIV: Libraries used as ground truth for our study
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